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Mr  President,  ladies  and  gentlemen, 
Thank  you  for  providing  me  with  the opportunity of  contributing 
to your  colloquium~, 
The  subject of your  colloquium  "Do  we  really  live  in a  crucial 
period,  and  if so  why?"  is one  that is  close to  my  heart. 
Of  course,  every  politician wants  to feel  that  the problems  he 
is wrestling  with  are  crucial  and  that  he  may  be  able  by  his 
actions  to guide  the  future development  of  the  world. 
But  for  the  future  of  the  European  Community,  this time  is 
certainly crucial.  Despite  the  almost  unbelievable achievements 
of  the  past  25  years;  despite  the  consolidation  into one 
. Cpmmunity  of  ten  Member  States;  despite the  desire of  two  more 
to  join;  the  economic  crisis  in which  we  find  ourselves  has 
put  a  question mark  over  all the  Community's  achievements  to 
date;  and  nowhere  more  so  than  over  the  role  to be  played by 
its institutions  in the development  of  economic  policy. 
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The  situation in which  the  European  Community  finds  itself today 
is that  we  have  come  through the 30  most  prosperous  years  in  history, 
which  made  us  better off  than  ever  before.  But  then  we  hit 
high  unemployment;  high  inflation;  and  economic  stagnation.  This 
has  l~ us  to a  crisis of self doubt.  We  are  scared that  the 
competitivity of  European  industry,  the creativity of  European 
entrepreneurs,  the dynamism  of  European  society,  and  the growth 
potential of  Europe  in  the world  economy  is going  to  let us  down. 
What  a  paradox  it is, to have  suffered such  a  loss  of  confidence 
after  such  a  period of  prosperity! 
Faced  with  this situation we  are  in doubt  as  to  what  government 
and  the  Community  institutions should  be  trying  to do.  Should 
they  increase  their interventions  to try and  promote  recovery? 
Or  should  they fall  back,  withdrawing  from  the marketplace, 
limiting their  interventions,  to give  recovery  a  chance? 
The  debate  on  the  role of  government  in economic  policy  is 
poignant  because  for  so  long  we  thought  that  we  had  the  answer 
to it.  It seems  ages  since  someone  said  "We  are all Keynesians 
now".  And  indeed,  it is  50  years  since  Keynes  published  the 
General  Theory  and  we  came  to  believe  that  the  question had 
been  answered  once  and  for all. 
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Those  specialized in business would  not  expect  one  more 
specialized in state-craft -an "accomplised generalist" 
as  you  have  been  kind  enough  to call.me - would  not  expect 
me  to be  excessively  rigorous or discursive  in my  economic 
analysis.  So  let  me  be  quite brief. 
What  have  we  learned  since the  1930s  on  the best  ways  to 
increase economic  activity? 
I  have  always  understood  that  Keynes  said governments  could 
help  the  economy  out  of  a  slump  by  pulling down  interest 
rates  (by  expanding  the money  supply)  or  by  restoring the 
confidence  of  investors through  fiscal  policy. 
Those  who  felt  convinced  of this certainly had  the  upper 
hand  in management  of  the  post-war  economies.  They  grew  ever 
more  confident  as  their economies  went  from  strength to strength. 
Do  you  remember  the  standard  economic  issue of  the 60s?  Are 
full  employment,  stable prices,  balance  of  payments  equilibrium 
and  rapid growth  compatible?  The  answer  seem~d clear of  course; 
thanks  to economic  fine  tuning,  the magic  square  was  obtainable. 
If  governments  missed  one  or  two  of  their targets,  it was 
because  they did  not  devote  enough  resources  to planning,  did 
not  employ  enough  economists and  only  made  forecasts  of  growth 
rates to 2 decimal  places  instead of  3. 
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Don't  let's forget.  Those  were  good  times  economically.  And 
if some  people  were  critical, it was  not  so  much  that  their 
living  standards were  falling as  that  they  wanted  them  to rise 
still faster  •••  just 15  years  ago  ••• 
Then  it all blew  up!  inflation; oil shortages;  stagnation and 
falling  investment;  sharp  competition  from  the  Pacific; 
controversy  among  economists. 
But  were  we  right  to be  surprised,  that  economic  policy 
should  have  hit  a  bad  patch  after  such  a  spectacular and 
prolonged  spell of  success?  Economic  text  books  don't 
normally  talk about  it, but  every  politician knows,  that 
there  have  been  few  enough  decades  this  century  where  there 
was  not  some  big  event  of  world  importance  which  could  be 
expected to overthrow  the  plans,  not  only  of  the  best 
prepared  economic  policy makers,  but  of  a  few  others  as 
well. 
In  the teens  there was  the  First  World  War;  in the  20s 
reparations  and  hyperinflation;  in the  30s  the  depression 
and  the  rise of  the dictators;  in·the 40s  the  Second 
World  War.  None  of  those  was  what  you  might  call  a  ''normar• 
economic  period. - 5  -
And  if the  50s  and  60s  were  an  era  of  unparalleled prosperity, 
it must  be  recalled that  they  were also a period of remarkable 
stability  in the major  Western  economies.  The  US  lay  in  the 
sunshine until  the  cloud  of  Vietnam  rolled over,  while  Europe 
experienced a  drive  for  stability through  unification.  The 
achievement  of those days  in  European  consolidation  seems 
almost  unbelievable  in  retrospect. 
Nor  is policy disturbed only  by  big  events.  Anyone  in  the 
regular  business  of  politics  knows  that  not  only  can  a  strategy 
or  a  policy be  overthrown  by  a  world  war,  but  are  subject  to 
upset  from  day  to day  by  the force  of  events  - someone  losing 
an  election,  an  unforeseen development  in public opinion,  a 
chance  discovery,  someone  missing  a  plane.  Such  is  the  nature 
of  politics. 
So  it is  hardly  surprising  (in  retrospect)  that  something 
eventually went  wrong.  And  it  is  a  measure  of  our  hubris  that 
we  thought  that all  we  would  have  to do  was  to adjust  our 
deficit a  little here  or there,  re-programme  the  computer  and 
off  we  would  go  again. - 6  -
But  it did not  work.  When  the  crisis hit us,  our  confidence 
collapsed.  As  our  belief  in demand  management  diminished, 
so  the  advocacy  of monetary  policy increased.  The  apparently 
simple policy of  establishing  rules  or targets for  the  money 
supply,  and  letting everything else go  its own  way,  was  more 
and  more  urgently pressed upon  us.  For  myself,  I  must  admit 
that  it did  not  seem  to me  likely that it would  be  any  more 
easy  to ·cO"lSi'stently  hit a  money  supply  target  without  major 
problems  arising elsewhere  than it had  been  to consistently 
hit a  full  employment  target.  I  don't  think  anything  in our 
subsequent  experience has  made  me  change  my  mind.  Indeed,  the 
press  coverage  that  Mr  Volcker  gets  in his efforts to meet 
money  supply  rules  shows  quite clearly that  no  one  in  business 
doubts  the  far  reaching  consequences  of  his actions.  His 
decisions  are political  in the  fullest  sense. 
In  listening to some  of  the  arguments  of  the  leading  economists 
-and  I  do  not  impugn  for  one  moment  the brilliance of  the 
arguments  that  some  of  them  deploy  - I  am  reminded  of  an 
anecdote  related  by  Mr  Bernard  Shaw,  who,  as  well  as  being 
what  might  be  described  as  a  romantic  socialist,  had  also 
the  good  sense  to  be  something  of  a  sceptic  in the  face  of 
sophisticated argument. - 7  -
Mr  Shaw  relates  how  he  one  day  came  upon  a  man  who  was  defending 
his  view  that  the  earth  was  flat.  Such  an  unorthodox  view  of 
course  provoked  furious  opposition  from  his  hearers who  became 
more  and  more  excited the more  their arguments  were  resisted. 
"We  know  the  earth  is  round"  said one  'because if you  sail west 
from  any  point  and  keep  going  long  enough  you  will  come  back  to 
where  you  started  ... 
"Have  you  ever  done  it?" asked  the flat earther. 
"We  know  the surface of  the earth  is curved  because  when  you 
look  out  to sea  the  sky  appears  to meet  the  sea  due  to the 
curvature  of  the earth"  said the other. 
11Have  you  ever  looked  up  a  straight  stretch of  railway  line 
and  seen  how  the  parallel  tracks  appear  to meet?"  answered 
the  flat earther. - 8-
"We  know  the earth  is  round,  because  it  casts  a  circular  shadow 
on  the moon  during  an  eclipse" argued  a  third. 
To  which  the flat earther responded  by  lifting a  dustbin  lid  and 
showing  how  it cast a  circular shadow  on  the  ground. 
At  this point  Mr  Shaw  intervened,  to  say that  in his  view  the 
arguments  of  the flat  earther  were  decisive;  but  that  they  proved 
that  the  earth  was  not  flat,  but  cylindrical. 
It seems  to  me  that  there are  a  lot  of  economic  policy  experts 
at  work  proving  that  the  earth  is cylindrical. 
In  other  words,  what  I  am  saying  is  that  sophisticated arguments 
which  seem  to prove  that  government  intervention  in economic 
policy  is  ineffective,  don't  derive  their credibility from  the 
theoretical  arguments  used  to  support  them  but  from  the  practical 
failures  of  recent  years. - 9-
And  the arguments  among  a  lot of  economic  policy experts  seem  to 
me  to  contain a  large measure  of  unreality.  Their  discussions 
seem  to  me  to  involve  a  lot of  "Ah,  yes,  but". 
"Ah,  yes,  but,  if you  had  applied  the policy  we  recommended  more 
fully  ••••  " 
"Ah,  yes,  but, if you  had  only  kept  going  longer  "  .... 
"Ah,  yes,  but  if you  did not  allow  yourselves  to be  put  off by 
the  reactions  of  bankers 
II  .... 
"Ah,  yes,  but,  you  must  not  allow  defeatist  industrialists to 
stop  you  .,  •• " 
"Ah,  yes  ,  but  if only  you  had  resisted the  temptation to 
interfere  ••••  " 
Ah,  yes,  but,  public  opinion  would  not  stand  for  a  government  who 
just  kept  going  as  inflation rose  and  the  balance of  payments  fell 
and  crisis was  all about  us.  And  I  am  doubtful  if it would  tolerate 
forever  governments  who  did  nothing  while  half  of 
our  young  people  are  unemployed  and  our  investments  and  living 
standards fall. 
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Nonetheless,  it does  seem  to me  that  the useful  point  that  has  come 
out  of all  the  recent  debates  is the  recognition of  the  importance 
of  expectations- although  I  still prefer  to call that  by  its more 
. 
familiar  name  of  "confidence".  It seems  indeed  to have  taken 
economists  a  long  time  to  spot  it.  Anyone  who  has  been  in business 
knows  - anyone  who  have  even  listened to  a  stock  market  report 
knows  - that  confidence  or  the  lack  of it  can  completely  overwhelm 
"fundamentals". 
Therefore  the  question  facing  governments  in taking economic  policy 
decisions  is  how  to  take  these  in such  a  way  as  to  increase 
confidence,  and  how  to avoid  taking decisions  or making  interventions 
which  undermine  confidence.  This  was  very  much  in our  minds  at 
the  Williamsburg  Summit.  Indeed,  the need  to generate  confidence 
is  itself a  justification for  holding  such  Summits,  even  if the 
detailed policies are  worked  out  elsewhere. 
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I  am  quite  willing  to  accept  that  in the  present  situation extensive 
"spend  your  way  out  of  recession"  policies  could  lead to a  collapse 
of  confidence,  because  enough  people  believe that  such  a  policy 
would  inevitably  lead  to  increased  inflation,  deteriorating 
balance of  payments  and  a  general  decline  in activity. 
On  the other  hand,  I  find  it hard  to believe that policies which 
leave  the  economy  bumping  along  at  the  bottom  of  a  recessjon  can 
be  such  as  to  inspire  confidence.  In  order  for  investment  to  take 
place,  there must  be  a  real  prospect  of  profits  and  sales.  It 
seems  to  me  unlikely that  recession  conditions will  promote  such 
expectations.  The  only policy that  can  generate  confidence 
amongst  investors  is a  policy  that  increases  the  chance  of 
reasonable  profit and  growing  sales. 
Therefore  the question  is not  whether  or not  government  should 
involve  itself  in economic  policy;  but  how,  hm~ far  and  with  what 
limited  aims  in view. 
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It is not  a  question of  whether  government  is  there  just to 
make  the  rules.  Government  is not  only entitled,  but  to some 
extent  obliged,  to take  action on  its own  discretion to 
influence  the  economy. 
Indeed  the  suggestion  that  government  can  somehow  confine 
itself to simply  making  the  rules  is naively  simple.  When 
a  decision falls on  your  desk,  however  carefully the  rules 
have  been  drawn,  they often  seem  ambiguous  and  difficult  to 
interpret.  Even  decisions  not  to  intervene  can  begin  to  look 
interventionist with  the  complexity  of  real  choices  before  you. 
But  in  saying  this  let  me  make  it perfectly clear  that  I 
recognize  that  many  government  interventions  in  economic 
policy making  in the past  have  certainly been  marred  by  excesses. 
These  fall  into four  broad  categories: 
-excessive volatility of  policy,  whether  it is 
hard  to adapt  to  an  ever  changing  situation;  whether  it  is 
the old problem  of  stop  and  go,  or  favouring  competition 
one  day  and  the  benefits  of  large  scale  industry the next, 
policy  makers  have  always  been  prone  to  changing  their minds; 
some  change  is  inevitable,  but  a  consistent  policy  framework 
needs  to be  maintained; 
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a  tendency  for  intervention to  become  pervasive;  we  all  know 
that it  is  much  easier  to  start  intervening  than  to  stop it; 
and  the  result  has  been  a  growth  in the  responsibility of 
government  until  it accounts  for  nearly  50%  of all expenditure; 
- the  tendency  of  government  to substitute its own  economic  wisdom 
for  the  market  place  wisdom  of  business;  this 
can  be  through  things  like  restrictive purchasing  arrangements 
-buying  only nationally produced  computers  - or  through 
politicians trying to  take  commercial  decisions  better  left 
to others; 
an  excess  of  optimism  in the  caring  society - which  might 
arise from  the  wrong  sort,  of  welfare.  I  cannot  find 
it  in  me  to  agree  that  the  growth  of  public  concern  for  the 
welfare  of  the  less  well  off  is  a  bad  thing;  but  when  we  are 
told that  much  of  the expenditure  does  not  reach  the  target 
groups,  then  we  can  afford  to  re-examine  our policies. 
It  is  interesting  to  review  Community  policy  in  the  light  of 
this  cri ti  ci sm. 
As  regards  macroeconomic  policy,  my  colleague  Mr  Ortoli  has 
strongly urged  th~ Member  States  to  restrict  the extent  of 
their  intervention;  but  he  has  made  it  very  plain that  there 
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should  be  a  limit  to this  restriction,  urging  that  if  further 
declines  in activity take  place,  the  automatic  stabilizers 
should  be  allowed  to operate  and  that  those  Member  States  who 
have  made  most  progress  in  controlling  their budgets  should  use  the 
room  for manoeuvre  thereby gained  to prevent  renewed  recession. 
In  advocating  this,  we  have  sought  to achieve  a  balanced, 
steady  policy  which  will  reinforce  the expectation of  a  sustainable 
recovery. 
Where  we have found situations of manifest crisis and  have the authority 
to act- and the most evident of them  is in the steel industry- we have been 
unwilling  to  abandon  the  responsibility of  government  to  the 
vagaries  of  the market  place.  In  such  cases,  where  the  forces 
at  work  appear to us  to be  such  that  individual  firms  are  unable 
to  withstand them  on  their own,but  where  the  common  good  requires 
the  survival  of  a  viable  Community  industry,  government  intervention 
cannot  be  shirked even  in the  face  of  public  criticism.  There 
would  be  far  more  criticism to be  faced  if the  industry,  with  its 
strategically vital output,  its skilled  Labour  force  and  its 
huge  fixed  investment,  was  just  allowed  to collapse. 
Or.·the  other  hand,  we  must  recognize  the  difficulties which  can 
arise  from  excessively  interventionist policies.  Our  own 
experien~e with  the  CAP  shows  the difficulty that  might 
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arise from  generalized price controls,  output 
guarantees  and  protection from  the  forces  of  the  international 
•arket place.  It shows  clearly the difficulty of 
escaping  from  interventions  begun  for  the  best  reasons -not 
because  there  has  been  any  shortage of  critics of  the weaknesses 
cf the  CAP,  but  because  of  the  lack  of politically practical 
suggestions  as  to  how  to  resolve  its problems  without  putting 
worse  ones  in their place. 
The  need  to generate  increased confidence  to promote  worthwhile 
investment  is well  met  in  my  view  by  the positive interventions 
of  the  Community  through  making  rules  for  a  game  that  we  can 
win.  I  mean  exploiting  the  potential of  our  large  internal 
market,  thereby  ensuring  that  the full  benefits  of  large scale 
production are  available  to  European  producers.  The  work 
undertaken  by  my  colleague,  Mr  Narjes,  in  trying to persuade  the 
Council  of  Ministers  to  complete  the  internal  market,  aims 
precisely to give  European  producers  these benefits.  It  is  a 
matter  of  serious  regret  that  the  Council,  despite notable 
progress,  has  yet  to take  the vital decisions  to  make  the 
<ompletion  of  the  internal market  into a  reality.  And  the  regret 
is not  just on  the part of  the  Commission.  It is still more 
on  the  part  of  firms  denied  the  benefits  of  an  extended  home 
market,  which  could  prepare  them  to  take  on  anyone  in  the world • 
. I. 
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The  dependence  of  the  Community  on  imported  energy  and  its 
susceptibility to serious damage  through  energy  shortages 
has  been  seen  only  too clearly over  the  past decade.  There-
fore  the initiative of  the  Commission  to ensure  the  development 
of  a  Community  energy strategy,  making  the  fullest  use  of  our 
own  resources  and  achieving  real  economies  in  energy  consumption, 
is a  fully  justified intervention in the  market  place. 
There  is also  general  recognition that  the  support  of  research 
and  development  at the pre-production stage is a  worthwhile 
investment  for  government.  If  we  are  to  be  in a  position to 
compete  successfully with  our  dynamic  trade  rivals,  we  cannot 
afford  to  confine  our  research  and  development  •ctivities to 
the  small  scale  prescribed  by  the  limits  of  firms  or  of  national 
resou~ces.  European  producers  must  have  access  to the  best  and 
latest  in technology. 
Further,  the  process  of  transferring the  results  of  research 
into industrial  innovation  and  useful  technology  is  one  of 
fundamental  concern  to us  all.  Measures  to  ensure  that  the 
-high  risks  inevitably encountered  in the early  stages  of  the 
- innovation  process  are  not  allowed  to prevent  the  investment 
from  being  made,  are  again  amply  justified at  a  Community  level • 
.  /. - 17  -
Let  me  remind  you  of  the position that  we  face  in the  area  of 
informatics.  It  is universally  recognized  that  we  are  in danger 
of  trailing the  Japanese  and  Americans  in this  field,  and  that 
to  do  so  puts  us  at  serious  risk  with  regard  to our  capacity  to 
produce  a  whole  generation of  products.  There  can  be  no  solution 
at  the  level  of  purely national policy  to  the problem  of 
recovering  lost  ground  and  establishing an  industry that  is 
strong  enough  to vie  with  world  leaders.  That  is why  we  have 
been  particularly concerned  to make  progress  in opening  the 
internal market  for  informatics  products,  ensuring  common 
European  standards  and  the  availability of  the  whole  market  to 
European  producers,  with  the  opening  of  a  share at  least  of 
public markets  to  competitive  tendering. 
At  the  level  of  applied  research,  the  ESPRIT  programme, 
in which  the  Commission  is  collaborating  with  a  series of  major 
European  companies,  has  been  enthusiastically  received  by  the 
industry.  Yet  I  must  tell you  that,  although  the  Council  in 
some  of  its formations  has  been  ready  and  willing  to  support 
these actions,  in full  recognition  of  their necessity,  in other 
formations  - such  as  the  budget  - the pursuit  of  nationalistic 
aims  has  been  in  grave  danger  of  squeezing  out  this  foundation 
for  our  future  prosperity.  This  is  the  sort of  intervention  we 
must  maintain  and  which  we  cannot  allow  to  be  sacrificed on  the 
altar of  budgetary doctrine. 
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Finally,  I  want  to say  a  word  about  our policies  in the  field  of 
employment.  The  greatest asset  of  the  European  Community  is its 
work  force.  The  number  of  young  people 
entering the  labour  market  should  be  a  major  source  of  dynamism 
and  inventiveness  for  our  economies.  It is  a  tragedy,  on  a  very 
large  scale,  that  so  m~ch of this vital  resource  is  presently 
being  wasted.  Let  me  remind  you  that  some  40~ of  our  11  million 
unemployed  are  under  the  age  of  25.  Our  policy,  while  unable  to 
abolish  the scourge  of  unemployment  in the  short  term,  has  been 
to  ensure  that  this  period of  enforced  idleness  is, as  far  as 
possible,  used  constructively.  Through  the  interventions  of  the 
European/ 
poc1al  Fund,  and  particularly  in its assistance  to young  people, 
we  are  seeking  to  ensure  that the  work  force  is  as  far as  possible 
prepared so  that  it can  lend  the  necessary dynamism  to the  recovery 
as  it develops  and  can  provide  the  work-force  for  participation in 
the  productive activities of  the  future. 
Therefore  let  me  sum  up  my  view  of  the  role of  the  Community 
institutions and  government  bodies  in economic  policy. 
Governments  cannot  do  everything.  As  the  effect  of  their actions 
on  confidence  is vital, it  seems  to  me  that  given  the  present 
situation,  and  present  public attitudes,  a  strict  limitation of 
macroeconomic  intervention  is  unavoidable. 
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But  government  cannot  be  satisfied with  doing  nothing.  It  is 
inconceivable  that  confidence  should  bloom  if it is  known  that 
no  matter  how  low  the  economy  sinks,  the  government  will  not 
intervene  to try to  improve  the  situation.  Well  defined, 
finite  interventions are  justified now  as  much  ~r more  than  ever 
before. 
A government  has  obligations  to  its electors  which  it cannot 
meet  by  renouncing  its duties.  But  it must  try to meet  them  in 
a  spirit of  realism  and  caution and,  dare  I  say  it, humility, 
in full  recognition  that its achievements  will  be  limited  and 
may  at  any  time  be  swept  away  by  events  beyond  its control.  And 
it must  try to ensure  that  the  public at  large and  businessmen 
in particular  recognize  these  limitations  and  do  not  blame  it 
for  f~iling to  achieve  the  impossible. 
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